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TOURO LAW REVIEW
satisfied the clear and convincing evidence requirement of article
65. He noted that the trial judge is in the best position to docu-
ment the child witness' psychological state for purposes of de-
termining whether he or she should testify by closed-circuit tele-
vision. In this case, the judge would have upheld the defendant's
conviction, noting that the trial judge documented ample evidence
that the child was eligible for article 65 protection. 80
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Henderson 81
(decided April 16, 1990)
The defendant, convicted of sodomy in the first degree, sexual
abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child,
asserted that her right to confront witnesses as guaranteed under
both the state82 and federal83 constitutions was violated when the
trial judge permitted, pursuant to article 65 of the state's
Criminal Procedure Law, 84 two complaining child witnesses to
testify by live two-way closed circuit television. While noting
that the court of appeals recently held that article 65 contains
sufficient safeguards to withstand a facial challenge on con-
frontation clause grounds, the second department held that as
applied to the defendant, it was violative of his confrontation
rights. 85
Prior to defendant's trial, the court, pursuant to section 65.20
of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, 86 granted the prose-
80. Id, at 272-76, 551 N.E.2d at 575-78, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 82-85
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
81. 156 A.D.2d 92, 554 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 736, 557 N.E.2d 1194, 558 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1990).
82. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-.30 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
85. Henderson, 156 A.D.2d at 97, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
86. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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cution's motion to hold a separate hearing to decide whether the
two complaining child witnesses were "vulnerable" witnesses as
defined by the provisions of article 65.87 The children, a ten year
old boy and eleven year old girl, were respectively five and six
years old at the time of the incident.
Subsequently, a hearing was held and an expert witness, a so-
cial worker experienced in the field of child sexual abuse, testi-
fied that each child would benefit if permitted to testify through
the use of two-way closed-circuit television. The expert witness
based her opinion on several observations made during two sepa-
rate interviews with the children. She noted that the boy "was
reluctant to talk about the incident, explaining that he 'felt bad'
and [that] 'it was nasty' .... "88 She further testified that discus-
sion of the defendant "gave [the boy] a stomach ache, and he was
afraid that she was going to send monsters to get him." 89
Accordingly, her professional opinion was that the boy would
benefit from article 65 protection on the basis that he was
frightened and angry towards the defendant, that he continued to
have nightmares, that the defendant was an authority figure, and
that there were multiple incidents of sexual abuse.
With regard to the girl, the expert witness opined that she
would also benefit from article 65 protection. While stating that
she was not as vulnerable as the boy, the expert noted that the
girl "was fearful of the defendant, and thinking about what the
defendant did to her and what she saw the defendant do to [the
boy] made her nauseous." 90 The expert also noted that the girl
experienced sleeping and eating disorders. Based on the expert's
testimony, the trial court ruled that the children should be permit-
ted to testify by closed circuit television, outside of the courtroom
setting and defendant's presence.
On appeal, the second department held that the expert testi-
mony failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the children would likely suffer extreme mental and emotional
87. For a discussion of these provisions see supra notes 39-52 and
accompanying text.
88. Henderson, 156 A.D.2d at 94, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 95, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
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harm as a result of testifying in the courtroom and in the presence
of the defendant. 91 Since this burden was not met, the court ruled
that the defendant's confrontation rights provided under the state
and federal constitutions were infringed upon by the trial court's
grant of article 65 protection to the child witnesses.
Pursuant to section 65.10 of the New York Criminal Procedure
Law, a trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence,
that "as a result of extraordinary circumstances," 92 a child wit-
ness will suffer severe mental or emotional harm if required to
testify in court and in the presence of the defendant. 93 The court
stated that the element of extraordinary circumstances required
the trial court to determine whether this particular child witness,
as opposed to all children similarly victimized, will suffer severe
mental and emotional harm solely from testifying in court and in
the presence of the defendant. The court added that the trial court
must also find that the use of closed-circuit television would
likely spare the child from this severe mental and emotional
harm. 94
The appellate court determined that the trial court failed to
show that there were any extraordinary circumstances which
would lead the complaining witnesses to be any different from
any other child who was victimized by sexual abuse. The court
stated that the expert witness' testimony left "the impression that
she is of the opinion that all child witnesses in sexual abuse cases
are vulnerable, that is, are subject to severe mental and emotional
harm if forced to testify in open court in the presence of the al-
leged perpetrator." 95 The court explained that the expert believed
that "all sexually abused children would benefit by testifying
outside of the accused's presence and outside of the imposing at-
mosphere of a courtroom." ' 96 While noting that all children
91. Id. at 101, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
92. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
93. Henderson, 156 A.D.2d at 98-99, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 927-28 (citing
N.Y. CRlm. PRoc. LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
94. Id. at 99, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 928 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §
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would clearly benefit from allowing them to testify by closed cir-
cuit television, the court determined that the expert's assessment
failed to satisfy the particularization requirement set forth in Coy
v. Iowa97 and People v. Cintron.98 In Henderson, because the
defendant's confrontation rights were not adequately protected,
the appellate court ordered a reversal of defendant's conviction
and remanded the case for retrial.
People v. Costa99
(decided April 16, 1990)
The defendant, convicted of endangering the welfare of a child,
contended that his confrontation rights under the statel00 and fed-
eral I01 constitutions were violated when the trial judge, pursuant
to article 65.00(2),102 ruled that the complaining child witness
was "vulnerable," ' 103 thus permitting him to testify by use of
two-way closed-circuit television. The court held that the
defendant's confrontation rights under the state and federal
constitution were violated. 104
The trial court based its ruling solely on observations of the
child while he testified in court and while he was present in an in
camera conference. 105 The court observed that the child cried
97. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). For a more detailed discussion of the federal
law on this case, see supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
98. 75 N.Y.2d 249, 551 N.E.2d 561, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1990).
99. 160 A.D.2d 889, 554 N.Y.S.2d 930 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 786, 559 N.E.2d 685, 559 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1990).
100. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
102. N.Y. CRi. PROC. LAW § 65.00(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991); see
supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of article 65
provisions.
103. Id. ("'Vulnerable child witness' means a child witness whom a court
has declared to be vulnerable."); see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text
for a discussion of what constitutes "vulnerable."
104. Costa, 160 A.D.2d at 890, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
105. Id. at 889, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 931. "Ajudicial proceeding is said to be
heard in camera either when the hearing is had before the judge in his private
chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom." BLACK'S
LAW DICIONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990).
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